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Abstract. Dynamic reconfigurations increase the availability and the
reliability of component-based systems by allowing their architectures to
evolve at runtime. Recently we have proposed a temporal pattern logic,
called FTPL, to characterize the correct reconfigurations of component-
based systems under some temporal and architectural constraints.
As component-based architectures evolve at runtime, there is a need to
check these FTPL constraints on the fly, even if only a partial infor-
mation is expected. Firstly, given a generic component-based model, we
review FTPL from a runtime verification point of view. To this end we
introduce a new four-valued logic, called RV-FTPL (Runtime Verifica-
tion for FTPL), characterizing the “potential” (un)satisfiability of the
architectural constraints in addition to the basic FTPL semantics. Po-
tential true and potential false values are chosen whenever an observed
behaviour has not yet lead to a violation or satisfiability of the prop-
erty under consideration. Secondly, we present a prototype developed to
check at runtime the satisfiability of RV-FTPL formulas when reconfig-
uring a Fractal component-based system. The feasability of a runtime
property enforcement is also shown. It consists in supervising on the
fly the reconfiguration execution against desired RV-FTPL properties.
The main contributions are illustrated on the example of a HTTP server
architecture.
1 Introduction
This paper deals with the formal specification and verification of dynamic recon-
figurations of component-based systems at runtime. Dynamic reconfigurations
increase the availability and the reliability of those systems by allowing their
architectures to evolve at runtime.
Dynamic reconfiguration of distributed applications is an active research
topic [1,2,21] motivated by practical distributed applications like, e.g., those
in Fractal [10] or OSGi3. In many recent works, the idea of using temporal logics
to manage applications at runtime has been explored [6,18,8,14].
3 http://www.osgi.org
In [14], we have proposed a temporal pattern logic, called FTPL, to char-
acterize the correct reconfigurations of component-based systems under some
temporal and architectural constraints (1). We have also explained in [19], how
to reuse a generic formal model to check the component-based model consistency
through reconfigurations, and to ensure that dynamic reconfigurations satisfy ar-
chitectural and integrity constraints, invariants, and also temporal constraints
over (re)configuration sequences (2).
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Fig. 1. Principle and contributions
As component-based architectures evolve at runtime, there is a need to eval-
uate the FTPL constraints on the fly, even if only a partial information can
be expected. Indeed, an FTPL property often cannot be evaluated to true or
false during the system execution. In addition, the reconfigurations change the
validity of FTPL constraints by modifying the component architecture. In this
paper, given a generic component-based model, we review FTPL from a runtime
verification point of view (3). To this end we introduce a new four-valued logic,
called RV-FTPL (Runtime Verification for FTPL), characterizing the “poten-
tial” (un)satisfiability of the architectural constraints in addition to the basic
FTPL semantics. Like in RV-LTL [8], potential true and potential false values
are chosen whenever an observed behaviour has not yet lead to a violation or
acceptance of the property under consideration.
We then integrate the runtime verification of temporal patterns into the Frac-
tal component model [10]. More precisely, we describe a prototype developed to
check at runtime—by reusing the FPath and FScript [12] tool supports—the
satisfiability of RV-FTPL formulas. This verification is performed when recon-
figurating a component-based system (4). More, the feasability of a runtime
property enforcement is also shown. It consists in supervising at runtime the re-
configuration execution in order to ensure that the RV-FTPL property of interest
is fulfilled (5): our 4-valued logic can help in guiding the reconfiguration process,
namely in choosing the next reconfiguration operations to be applied. The main
contributions are illustrated on the example of a HTTP server architecture.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. After introducing a moti-
vating example in Sect. 2, we briefly recall, in Sects. 3 and 4, the considered archi-
tectural (re-)configuration model and the FTPL syntax and semantics. We then
define in Sect. 5 the runtime verification of FTPL (RV-FTPL) refining FTPL
semantics with potential true and potential false values. Section 6 describes a
prototype implementing the RV-FTPL verification, and its integration into the
Fractal framework. Section 7 explains how to enforce, at runtime, Fractal com-
ponent system reconfigurations against desired RV-FTPL properties. Finally,
Section 8 concludes before discussing related work.
2 Motivating Example
To motivate and to illustrate our approach, let us consider an example of an
HTTP server from [11]. The architecture of this server is displayed in Fig. 2.
The RequestReceiver component reads HTTP requests from the network
and transmits them to the RequestHandler component. In order to keep the
response time as short as possible, RequestHandler can either use a cache (with
the component CacheHandler) or directly transmit the request to the Request-
Dispatcher component. The number of requests (load) and the percentage of
similar requests (deviation) are two parameters defined for the RequestHandler
component:
– The CacheHandler component is used only if the number of similar HTTP
requests is high.
– The memorySize for the CacheHandler component must depend on the over-
all load of the server.
– The validityDuration of data in the cache must also depend on the overall
load of the server.
– The number of used file servers (like the FileServer1 and FileServer2 compo-
nents) used by RequestDispatcher depends on the overall load of the server.
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Fig. 2. HTTP Server architecture
We consider that the HTTP server can be reconfigured during the execution
by the following reconfiguration operations:
1. AddCacheHandler and RemoveCacheHandler which are respectively used to
add and remove the CacheHandler component when the deviation value
increased/decreased around 50;
2. AddFileServer and removeFileServer which are respectively used to add and
remove the FileServer2 component;
3. MemorySizeUp and MemorySizeDown which are respectively used to increase
and to decrease the MemorySize value;
4. DurationValidityUp and DurationValidityDown to respectively increase and de-
crease the ValidityDuration value.
As an illustration, we specify the AddCacheHandler reconfiguration expressed
in the FScript language [12]. When the deviation value exceeds 50, the recon-
figuration consists in instantiating a CacheHandler component. Then, the com-
ponent is integrated into the architecture, and the binding with the required
interface of RequestHandler is established. Finally, the component CacheHan-
dler is started.
1 action AddCacheHandler(root)
2 newCache = new("CacheHandler");
3 add($root , $newCache);
4 bind($root/child :: RequestHandler/interface ::getcache , $newCache/
interface :: cache);
5 start($newCache);
3 Architectural (Re-)Configuration Model
This section recalls the generic model for component-based architectures given
in [14] and inspired by the model in [20,21] for Fractal. Both models are graphs
allowing one to represent component-based architectures and reconfiguration
operations and to reason about them.
Component-based models must provide mechanisms for systems to be dy-
namically adapted—through their reconfigurations—to their environments dur-
ing their lifetime. These dynamic reconfigurations may happen because of ar-
chitectural modifications specified in primitive operations. Notice that reconfig-
urations are not the only manner to make an architecture evolve. The normal
running of different components also changes the architecture by modifying pa-
rameter values or stopping components, for instance.
3.1 Component-based architectures
In general, the system configuration is the specific definition of the elements
that define or prescribe what a system is composed of. The architectural ele-
ments we consider (components, interfaces and parameters) are the core entities
of a component-based system and relations over them to express various links
between these basic architectural elements. We consider a graph-based represen-
tation illustrated by Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Architectural elements and relations between them
In our model, a configuration c is a tuple 〈Elem,Rel〉 where Elem is a set of
architectural elements, and Rel ⊆ Elem× Elem is a relation over architectural
elements.
The architectural elements of Elem are the core entities of a component-
based system:
– Components is a non-empty set of the core entities, i.e components;
– RequiredInterfaces and ProvidedInterfaces are defined to be subsets of
Interfaces. Their union is disjunctive;
– Parameters is a set of component parameters.
The architectural relation Rel then expresses various links between the pre-
viously mentioned architectural elements.
– InterfaceType is a total function that associates a type with each required
and provided interface;
– Provider is a total surjective function which gives the component having at
least a provided interface, whereas Requirer is only a total function;
– Contingency is a total function which indicates for each required interface
if it is mandatory or optional;
– Definer is a total function which gives the component of a considered pa-
rameter;
– Parent is a partial function linking sub-components to the corresponding
composite component. Composite components have no parameter, and a
sub-component must not be a composite including its parent component,
and so on;
– Binding is a partial function which connects together a provided interface
and a required one: a provided interface can be linked to only one required
interface, whereas a required interface can be the target of more than one
provided interface. Moreover, two linked interfaces do not belong to the
same component, but their corresponding instantiated components are sub-
components of the same composite component. The considered interfaces
must have the same interface type, and they have not yet been involved in
a delegation;
– Delegate expresses delegation links. It is a partial bijection which associates
a provided (resp. required) interface of a sub-component with a provided
(resp. required) interface of its parent. Both interfaces must have the same
type, and they have not yet been involved in a binding;
– State is a total function which associates a value from {started, stopped}
with each instantiated component: a component can be started only if all
its mandatory required interfaces are bound or delegated;
– Last, V alue is a total function which gives the current value of a considered
parameter.
Complete and formal definitions can be found in [19].
Example 1. Figure 4 gives a graph-based representation of the example from
Sect. 2. In this figure, the architectural elements are depicted as boxes and
circles, whereas architectural relations are represented by arrows.
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Fig. 4. Graph-based representation of the HTTP Server example
3.2 Dynamicity of Component Architectures
To support system evolution, some component models provide mechanisms to dy-
namically reconfigure the component-based architecture, during their execution.
These dynamic reconfigurations are then based on architectural modifications,
among the following primitive operations:
– instantiation/destruction of components;
– addition/removal of components;
– binding/unbinding of component interfaces;
– starting/stopping components;
– setting parameter values of components;
or combinations of them. A component architecture may also evolve by modifying
parameter values or stopping components, like in the example.
Considering the component-based architecture model recalled in Sect. 3.1, a
reconfiguration action is modelled by a graph transformation operation adding
or removing nodes and/or arcs in the graph of the configuration. An evolu-
tion operation op transforms a configuration c = 〈Elem,Rel〉 into another
one c′ = 〈Elem′, Rel′〉. It is represented by a transition from c to c′, noticed
c
op
→ c′. Among the evolution operations (running operations and reconfigura-
tions), we particularly focus on the reconfiguration ones, which are either the
above-mentioned primitive architectural operations or their compositions. The
remaining running operations are all represented by a generic operation, called
the run operation; it is also the case for sequences of running operations.
The evolution of a component architecture is defined by the transition system
〈C,Rrun,→〉 where:
– C = {c, c1, c2, . . .} is a set of configurations;
– Rrun = R∪ {run} is a finite set of evolution operations;
– → ⊆ C ×Rrun × C is the reconfiguration relation.
Given the model M = 〈C,Rrun,→〉, an evolution path (or a path for short)
σ of M is a (possibly infinite) sequence of configurations c0, c1, c2, . . . such that
∀i ≥ 0.∃ri ∈ Rrun.ci
ri→ ci+1 ∈→)).
We use σ(i) to denote the i-th configuration of a path σ. The notation
σi denotes the suffix path σ(i), σ(i + 1), . . ., and σ
j
i denotes the segment path
σ(i), σ(i + 1), σ(i + 2), ..., σ(j − 1), σ(j). The segment path is infinite in length
when the last state of the segment is repeated infinitely often. We write Σ to
denote the set of evolution paths, and Σf (⊆ Σ) for the set of finite paths.
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Fig. 5. Part of an evolution path of the HTTP server example
Example 2. A possible evolution path of the HTTP server is given in Fig. 5. In
this path,
– c0 is a configuration of the HTTP server without the CacheHandler nor
FileServer2 components;
– c1 is obtained from c0: the load value was changed following the running of
the RequestHandler component;
– c′1 is the same configuration as c1: Without the CacheHandler component,
the RemoveCacheHandler reconfiguration cannot terminate, it is then roll-
backed without any modification;
– c2 is obtained from the configuration c1 by adding CacheHandler, following
the AddCacheHandler reconfiguration operation;
– c3 is the configuration c2 in which the memorySize value was increased;
– c′3 is the same configuration as c3: The result of the running is not observable;
– c4 is obtained from c3 by adding the FileServer2 component;
– c5 is like the configuration c6 but the durationValidity value was increased.
4 FTPL
In this section, we recall the syntax of the linear temporal logic for dynamic re-
configurations introduced in [14] and called FTPL. It allows characterizing the
correct behaviour of reconfiguration-based systems by using architectural invari-
ants and linear temporal logic patterns. FTPL has been inspired by proposals
in [15], and their temporal extensions for JML [24,9,17].
Let us first recall the FTPL syntax as presented in [14]. A configuration
property, denoted with conf , is a first order logic formula over sets and rela-
tional operations on the primitive sets and over relations defined in Sect. 3.1. A
trace property, denoted with trace, is a temporal constraint on (a part of) the
execution of the dynamic reconfiguration model. Further, for a reconfiguration
operation ope, its ending is considered as an event.
event ::= ope terminates
| ope exceptional
| ope normal
trace ::= always conf
| eventually conf
| trace1 ∧ trace2
| trace1 ∨ trace2
temp ::= after event temp
| before event trace
| trace until event
The trace properties specify the constraints to ensure
on a sequence of reconfigurations. We mainly spec-
ify the always and eventually constraints which
respectively describe that a property has to be sat-
isfied by every configuration of the sequence for the
former, or by at least one configuration of the se-
quence for the latter.
Every temporal property concerns a part of the execution trace on which
the property should hold: it is specified with special keywords, like e.g., after,
before or until a particular event has happened.
The set of FTPL formulae is denoted with FTPL. The complete and detailed
semantics can be found in [14].
Example 3. Let us now illustrate the FTPL language on the example of the
HTTP server from Sect. 2. Notice that the reconfiguration AddCacheHandler
(resp. RemoveCacheHandler) adds (resp. removes) CacheHandler when the devi-
ation value is greater (resp. less) than 50:
Property 1 :
after RemoveCacheHandler terminates
(eventually deviation>50
until AddCacheHandler terminates)
The previous property specifies that the deviation value eventually becomes
greater than 50 between the two considered reconfigurations.
5 Runtime Verification for FTPL: RV-FTPL
As component-based architectures evolve at runtime, there is a need to check
the FTPL constraints on the fly, even if only a partial information is expected.
Indeed, an FTPL property often cannot be evaluated to true or false during the
system execution, as only the history of the system is available and no specifica-
tion of its future evolution exists. In addition, as architectural reconfigurations
change the component architecture, they also change the values of FTPL con-
straints.
In this paper we review the FTPL semantics from a runtime verification
point of view. To this end we introduce a new four-valued logic, called RV-FTPL
(Runtime Verification for FTPL), characterizing the “potential” (un)satisfiability
of the architectural constraints in addition to the basic FTPL semantics. Intu-
itively, potential true and potential false values are chosen whenever an observed
behaviour has not yet lead to a violation or acceptance of the property under
consideration.
Let S be a set and R a relation over S×S. R is a pre-ordering iff it is reflexive
and transitive, and a partial ordering iff it is anti-symmetric in addition. For a
partial ordering R, the pair (S,R) is called a partially ordered set; it is sometimes
denoted S when the ordering is clear. A lattice is a partially ordered set (S,R)
where for each x, y ∈ S, there exists (i) a unique greatest lower bound, and (ii) a
unique least upper bound. A lattice is finite iff S is finite. Every finite lattice has
a well-defined unique least element, often called the minimum, and a well-defined
greatest element, often called the maximum.
More specifically, let B4 = {⊥,⊥
p,⊤p,⊤} be a set where ⊥,⊤ stand resp.
for false and true values where as ⊥p,⊤p stand resp. for potential false and
potential true values. We consider B4 together with the truth non-strict ordering
relation ⊑ satisfying ⊥ ⊑ ⊥p ⊑ ⊤p ⊑ ⊤. On B4 we define the unary operation
¬ as ¬⊥ = ⊤, ¬⊤ = ⊥, ¬⊥p = ⊤p, and ¬⊤p = ⊥p, and we define two binary
operations ⊓ and ⊔ as the minimum, respectively the maximum, interpreted
with respect to ⊑. Thus, (B4,⊑) is a finite de Morgan lattice but not a Boolean
lattice.
Before defining the RV-FTPL semantics, let us recall that a configuration
property conf ∈ FTPL is valid on a configuration c = 〈Elem,Rel〉 when the
evaluation of conf on the configuration c = 〈Elem,Rel〉 is true, written [c |=
conf ] = ⊤; otherwise, the property conf is not valid on c, written [c |= conf ] =
⊥.
Definition 1 (RV-FTPL Semantics). Let σn0 ∈ Σ
f be a finite execution path
of the length n + 1. Given an FTPL property, its value on σn0 is given by the
interpretation function [_ |= _]rv : Σ
f × FTPL→ B4 defined as follows:
1. For the configuration properties and events:
[σn0 (i) |= conf ]rv =
{
⊤ if [σn0 (i) |= conf ] = ⊤
⊥ otherwise
[σn0 (i) |= ope normal]rv =


⊤ if 0 < i 6 n ∧ σn0 (i− 1) 6= σ
n
0 (i)
∧ σn0 (i− 1)
ope
→ σn0 (i) ∈→
⊥ otherwise
[σn0 (i) |= ope exceptional]rv =


⊤ if 0 < i 6 n ∧ σn0 (i− 1) = σ
n
0 (i)
∧ σn0 (i− 1)
ope
→ σn0 (i) ∈→
⊥ otherwise
[σn0 (i) |= ope terminates]rv =
{
⊤ if ope normal ∨ ope exceptional
⊥ otherwise
2. For the trace properties:
[σn0 |= always conf ]rv =
{
⊥ if ∃i.(0 6 i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= conf ]rv = ⊥)
⊤p otherwise
[σn0 |= eventually conf ]rv =
{
⊤ if ∃i.(0 6 i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= conf ]rv = ⊤)
⊥p otherwise
[σn0 |= trace1 ∧ trace2]rv = [σ
n
0 |= trace1]rv ⊓ [σ
n
0 |= trace2]rv
[σn0 |= trace1 ∨ trace2]rv = [σ
n
0 |= trace1]rv ⊔ [σ
n
0 |= trace2]rv
3. For the temporal properties:
[σn0 |= after event temp]rv =


⊤p if ∀i.(0 6 i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
⇒ [σni |= temp]rv = ⊤) ∨ ∀i.(0 < i 6 n
⇒ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊥)
⊥ if ∃i.(0 6 i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
∧ [σni |= temp]rv = ⊥)
⊥p if ∃i.(0 6 i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
∧ [σni |= temp]rv = ⊥
p)
[σn0 |= before event trace]rv =


⊤p if ∀i.(0 < i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
⇒ [σi−1
0
|= trace]rv ∈ {⊤,⊤
p}) ∨
∀i.(0 < i 6 n⇒ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊥)
⊥ if ∃i.(0 < i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
∧ [σi−1
0
|= trace]rv ∈ {⊥,⊥
p})
[σn0 |= trace until event]rv =


⊤p if ∀i.(0 < i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
⇒ [σi−1
0
|= trace]rv ∈ {⊤,⊤
p})
⊥ if ([σn0 |= trace]rv = ⊥) ∨
(∃i.(0 < i 6 n ∧ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊤
∧ [σi−1
0
|= trace]rv = ⊥
p)
⊥p if ∀i.(0 < i 6 n ⇒ [σn0 (i) |= event]rv = ⊥
Let us now comment and illustrate the above definition. The goal of our
work is to be able to detect when the FTPL properties become false. So, for
configuration properties and events, the interpretation does only depend on the
fact that considered configurations actually belong to the path σn0 . For events,
the basic FTPL semantics is reflected in the interpretation function.
For trace properties the intuition is as follows.
– The always conf property is not satisfied on σn0 if there is a configuration
of σn0 which does not satisfy conf . For the other cases, the property is eval-
uated to be ”potentially true”. Indeed, if the execution terminated in σn0 , the
property would be satisfied.
– The eventually conf property is satisfied on σn0 if at least one configuration
of σn0 satisfies conf . In the other cases, the property is evaluated to be
”potentially false”. Indeed, if the execution terminated in σn0 , the property
would be violated.
Example 4. Figure 6 displays an evolution path of the HTTP example. The next
array illustrates the evaluation of two trace properties on each configuration,
depending on the chosen either FTPL or RV-FTPL semantics:
...
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7
Add
CacheHandler
Remove
CacheHandler
... ... ... ...
deviation
< 50
deviation
< 50
deviation
< 50
deviation
< 50
deviation
< 50
deviation
> 50
deviation
> 50
deviation
> 50
Fig. 6. Part of an evolution path of the HTTP server example
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 . . .
always deviation < 50
FTPL ? ? ? ? ? ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
RV-FTPL ⊤p ⊤p ⊤p ⊤p ⊤p ⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
eventually deviation > 50
FTPL ? ? ? ? ? ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
RV-FTPL ⊥p ⊥p ⊥p ⊥p ⊥p ⊤ ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
Considering the FTPL semantics, we cannot conclude about the interpreta-
tion of the considered properties, until we reach the configuration c5. On the
contrary, in RV-FTPL we say at the beginning that the always property is
expected to be true in the future, until we reach c5 where it is false.
The intuition of the definition of temporal properties is as follows:
– The value of the after event temp property is potentially true either if the
event event does not occur in all considered configurations, or if the occur-
rence of the event event on a configuration implies that the temp temporal
property is evaluated to true on the suffix of the path starting at this con-
figuration. The after event temp property is evaluated to false if there is a
configuration σn0 (i) of σ
n
0 where the event event happens and temp is eval-
uated to false on the suffix σni . The after event temp property is evaluated
to potentially false if there is a configuration σn0 (i) of σ
n
0 where the event
event occurs, and temp is evaluated to potentially false on the suffix σni .
– The value of the before event trace property is potentially true if either
the event event does not occur in all considered configurations, or if trace
is evaluated either to true or to potentially true on the prefix of the path
where the event event occurs. The before event trace property is evaluated
to false if there is a configuration σn0 (i) of σ
n
0 where event happens, and
trace is evaluated either to false or to potentially false on the path ending
at σn0 (i), non including this configuration.
– The value of the trace until event property is potentially true if the trace
property is evaluated either to true or to potentially true on the prefix of
the path where there is a configuration satisfying event, the prefix being
without that configuration. The trace until event property is evaluated to
false either if there is a configuration σn0 (i) of σ
n
0 where event happens, and
if trace is either false or potentially false on the path ending at σn0 (i) but
non-including it; or if σn0 does not satisfy the trace property when event
does not happen on σn0 . The property is potentially false if the event event
does not occur in all considered configurations.
Example 5. Let us again consider the path in Fig. 6 and the FTPL property 1
after RemoveCacheHandler terminates
(eventually deviation>50
until AddCacheHandler terminates)
explained in Example 3. The following array displays the value of the considered
property interpreted respectively in FTPL and in RV-FTPL:
c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 . . .
Property 1
FTPL ? ? ? ? ? ? ⊤ ⊤ ⊤
RV-FTPL ⊤p ⊤p ⊥p ⊥p ⊥p ⊥p ⊤p ⊤p ⊤p
From the FTPL semantics point of view, we cannot conclude about the validity
of the property until we reach the configuration c6. Using the RV-FTPL se-
mantics, the property interpretation is potential true before the reconfiguration
RemoveCacheHandler is executed. Then, the property value becomes potential
false until the deviation becomes greater than 50 on c5; as a consequence the
property value becomes potentially true because of partial information.
6 Using RV-FTPL Properties to Check Reconfigurations
The proposals of the paper have been applied to the Fractal component model.
Thsi section presents the prototype we have been developing to check at runtime
the satisfiability of RV-FTPL formulas on Fractal component-based systems. To
this end, it exploits and adapts the FPath and FScript [12] tool supports for
Fractal to evaluate the desired RV-FTPL formulas after each reconfiguration
operation.
6.1 Overview of Fractal, FPath and FScript
The Fractal model is a hierarchical and reflective component model intended
to implement, deploy and manage software systems [10]. A Fractal component
is both a design and a runtime entity that consists of a unit of encapsulation,
composition and configuration. A component is wrapped in a membrane which
can show and control a casually connected representation of its encapsulated
content. This content is either directly an implementation in case of a primitive
component, or sub-components for composite components.
In order to control the internal structure of a component at runtime, the
Fractal model also defines standard interfaces named controllers. In addition,
the Fractal model can be extended thanks to new controllers which allow the
user to integrate new features.
FPath [12] is a domain-specific language inspired by the XPath language
that provides a notation and introspection mechanisms to navigate inside Fractal
architectures. FPath expressions use the properties of components (e.g. the value
of a component attribute or the state of a component) or architectural relations
between components (e.g. the subcomponents of a composite component) to
express queries about Fractal architectures.
FScript [12] is a language that allows the definition of reconfigurations of
Fractal architectures. FScript integrates FPath seamlessly in its syntax, FPath
queries being used to select the elements to reconfigure. To ensure the reliability
of its reconfigurations, FScript considers them as transactions and integrates a
back-end that implements this semantics on top of the Fractal model.
6.2 Integrating RV-FTPL Property Verification into Fractal
To check RV-FTPL properties at runtime, we have implemented two Fractal
controllers which observe the Fractal component model: our first controller,
called the reconfiguration controller, permits capturing reconfiguration invoca-
tions, whereas the second controller, called the RV-FTPL controller, handles
RV-FTPL formulas.
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Fig. 7. RV-FTPL runtime verification principle
Figure 7 explains how both controllers are used to evaluate properties of
interest. When a reconfiguration is invoked (1), the reconfiguration controller
executes the reconfiguration (2)—specified in a FScript file—on the considered
component-based architecture. It then invokes the RV-FTPL controller (3) to
evaluate the RV-FTPL properties from a file (4) where those properties are
specified. The RV-FTPL controller uses the instantiated component model (5)
and executes queries over it: to post up the property evaluation result to the
user, the RV-FTPL controller parses the property of interest and uses a visitor
to evaluate it on the current configuration using FPath. In the case of the future
patterns containing the after keyword, the visitor waits for the reconfiguration
event before evaluating the temporal part of the property. On the contrary, for
the past patterns, i.e., the RV-FTPL properties without the after keyword, the
trace part of the property is evaluated before the reconfiguration event appears.
This avoids us from saving all the previous configurations needed to evaluate the
property once the event appears.
Fig. 8. Running prototype
The above verification procedure has been integrated into the EVA4Fractal
tool previously described in [13]. Figure 8 shows our prototype in action: a
Fractal implementation of the HTTP server example is running and the FTPL
property
after RemoveCacheHandler terminates
(eventually deviation>50
until AddCacheHandler terminates)
is evaluated at runtime after each reconfiguration execution. The reader can
notice that after the execution of the reconfiguration RemoveCacheHandler, the
value of the property is potential false. If the value of deviation raises above
50, when the reconfiguration AddCacheHandler is applied, the property value
becomes true.
7 Using RV-FTPL Properties to Enforce Reconfigurations
As explained in Sect. 1, one of the main motivations of the present work is to use
the RV-FTPL property evaluation to control the execution of reconfigurations.
Actually, for some kind of systems like critical systems or embedded systems, the
behaviour where the property evaluation becomes false might be not acceptable.
To this end, we can use potential true or potential false values to enforce the
reconfigurations.
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Fig. 9. RV-FTPL runtime enforcement principle
In this section, we show the capability of our monitor to enforce the
component-based system reconfigurations by using the interpretation of desired
properties. The principle is illustrated in Fig. 9. While interpreting RV-FTPL
properties (1), the potential true or potential false values can be used to guide
the choice of the next reconfiguration operation (2) which will be applied to the
component architecture (3). Let us give an intuition about our approach:
1. Let us consider the RV-FTPL property 3 valued ⊥p on the current architec-
tural configuration c5 from the path given in Fig. 6;
2. We are looking for enabling the reconfiguration operations that make the
component-architecture evolve to a new architectural configuration where
the RV-FTPL property will be enforced;
3. The reconfiguration manager chooses the reconfiguration AddCacheHandler
to be applied;
4. The property will be enforced: it is valued to ⊤p on the new configuration
c6.
In Fractal an obvious manner to implement the reconfiguration choice proce-
dure is to reuse the transaction mechanism of FScript [12], allowing the system
to rollback to a consistent state when a reconfiguration operation failed. We
propose to exploit this mechanism to evaluate the RV-FTPL property on the
possible target configurations, until a reconfiguration operation where the sys-
tem benefits enforcement in the best possible way, is found.
We display in Fig. 10 the execution scenario using this mechanism. For each
FScript reconfiguration, a transaction is started and the considered reconfigu-
ration operation is executed. Then, the RV-FTPL property is evaluated on the
reached configuration. If the interpretation value is true, there is no need to
consider remaining reconfiguration operations, so the transaction is committed
and the execution goes on. For other interpretation values, the transaction is
rollbacked and the results of the reconfiguration valuation are recorded. When
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Fig. 10. Enforcement scenario
all the enable reconfigurations are explored, the recorded results are used to
choose the most appropriate reconfiguration operation which is then applied to
the system. To help this choice, adaptation policies [13,11] defined by the user, or
distributed controllers [18] for knowledge-based priority properties, or runtime
enforcement monitors [16] built automatically for several enforcable properties,
can be used.
If for every reconfiguration operation the property of interest is violated, the
execution should be either stopped or continued with special recovery operations,
and the user should be informed. This reaction clearly depends on the system
features (safety critical systems, embedded systems, etc.). Again, adaptation
policies can be used to handle events associated with the property violation on
the one hand, and to specify special recovery reconfiguration operations, on the
other hand.
8 Conclusion
As component-based architectures evolve at runtime, this paper pays particu-
lar attention to checking—on the fly—temporal and architectural constraints
expressed with a linear time temporal logic over (re)configuration sequences,
FTPL [14]. Unfortunately, an FTPL property often cannot be evaluated to true
or false during the system execution. Indeed, only a partial information about the
system evolution is available: only a (finite) history of the system state is known,
and no specification about its future evolutions exists. To remedy this problem,
we have reviewed the FTPL semantics from a runtime verification point of view.
Inspired by proposals in [8], we have introduced a new four-valued logic, called
RV-FTPL, characterizing the “potential” (un)satisfiability of the architectural
FTPL constraints in addition to the basic FTPL semantics.
The paper has also reported on the prototype we have been developing to
verify and enforce RV-FTPL properties. Given a Fractal component-based sys-
tem [10] and some desired temporal and archtectural FTPL contraints, to make
it possible the system to reconfigure, the prototype interprets RV-FTPL formu-
las at runtime. The feasability of a runtime property enforcement has also been
discussed: the proposed 4-valued logic not only captures information absence,
but also helps the monitor in guiding the reconfiguration process, namely in
choosing the next reconfiguration operations to be applied.
Related work.
In the context of dynamic reconfigurations, ArchJava [3] gives means to re-
configure Java architectures, and the ArchJava language guarantees communica-
tion integrity at runtime. Barringer and al. give a temporal logic based framework
to reason about the evolution of systems [5]. In [4], a temporal logic is proposed
to specify and verify properties on graph transformation systems.
In the Fractal-based framework, the work in [21] has defined integrity con-
straints on a graph-based representation of Fractal, to specify the reliabil-
ity of component-based systems. Unlike [21], our model lays down only gen-
eral architectural constraints, thus providing an operational semantics to other
component-based systems, to their refinements and property preservation issues.
On the integrity constraints side, the FTPL logic allows specifying architectural
constraints more complex than architectural invariants in [12]. Let us remark
that architectural invariants as presented in [12] can be handled within the FTPL
framework by using always cp, where cp represents the considered architectural
invariant.
Among other applications, our proposals aim at a monitoring of component-
based systems. In [6], Basin and al. have shown the feasibility of monitoring tem-
poral safety properties (and, more recently, security properties) using a runtime
monitoring approach for metric First-order temporal logic (MFOTL). In [23,22],
monitors are used to check some policies at runtime, and to enforce the pro-
gram to evolve correctly by applying reconfigurations. A similar approach based
on a three-valued variant of LTL has been proposed in [7]. Contrary to those
works, we focus on temporal and architectural constraints to make it possible
component-based systems to reconfigure at runtime.
In [8], a three-valued and a four-valued LTL are studied from a logic point
of view. In [16], the authors have studied the class of enforceable properties
from the point of view of the well-known temporal property hierarchies. The
automatic monitor generation for enforceable properties has also been proposed.
In this direction, it would be interesting and important to characterize the FTPL
temporal patterns wrt. the class of enforceable properties. For non-enforceable
temporal patterns, we intend to exploit event-based adaptation policies to make
the system behave and reconfigure according to a given recovery policy when
the desired property is violated.
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